UNITED NATIONS
*Office on Drugs and Crime*

Government of Afghanistan
Ministry of Counter Narcotics

# Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007

## Executive Summary

August 2007

# ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| AEF | Afghan Eradication Force |
| ANP | Afghan National Police |
| GPS | Global Positioning System |
| ICMP | Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (UNODC) |
| MCN | Ministry of Counter-Narcotics |
| RAS | Research and Analysis Section (UNODC) |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The following organizations and individuals contributed to the implementation of the 2007 Afghanistan Opium Survey and to the preparation of this report:

***Ministry of Counter-Narcotics:***

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***United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Kabul)***

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***United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Vienna)***

Anja Korenblik (Programme Manager, RAS), Thibault le Pichon (Chief, RAS), Martin Raithelhuber (Programme Officer, RAS/ICMP), Patrick Seramy (Database management, RAS/ICMP).

The implementation of the survey would not have been possible without the dedicated work of the field surveyors, who often faced difficult security conditions.

The UNODC Illicit Crop Monitoring activities in Afghanistan were made possible by financial contributions from the European Commission and the Governments of the United Kingdom, Finland and the United States of America.

# Afghanistan

## 2007 Annual Opium Poppy Survey

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# Foreword

***The world's leading drug producer***

In 2007, Afghanistan cultivated 193,000 hectares of opium poppies, an increase of 17% over last year. The amount of Afghan land used for opium is now larger than the corresponding total for coca cultivation in Latin America (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia combined).

Favourable weather conditions produced opium yields (42.5 kg per hectare) higher than last year (37.0 kg/ha). As a result, in 2007 Afghanistan produced an extraordinary 8,200 tons of opium (34% more than in 2006), becoming practically the exclusive supplier of the world's deadliest drug (93% of the global opiates market). Leaving aside 19th century China, that had a population at that time 15 times larger than today's Afghanistan, no other country in the world has ever produced narcotics on such a deadly scale.

***A divided country***

On aggregate, Afghanistan's opium production has thus reached a frighteningly new level, twice the amount produced just two years ago. Behind this headline we note however an important development -- a fault-line now divides the country, with opium cultivation trends moving in opposite directions.

In centre-north Afghanistan, despite massive poverty, opium cultivation has diminished. The number of opium-free provinces more than doubled, from 6 last year to 13 in 2007. A leading example is the province of Balkh, where opium cultivation collapsed from 7,200 hectares last year to zero today. Other Afghan provinces should be encouraged to follow the model of this northern region where leadership, incentives and security have led farmers to turn their backs on opium.

In south-west Afghanistan, despite relatively higher levels of income, opium cultivation has exploded to unprecedented levels. This year around 70% of the country's poppies were grown in five provinces along the border with Pakistan. An astonishing 50% of the whole Afghan opium crop comes from one single province: Hilmand. With just 2.5 million inhabitants, this relatively rich southern province has become the world's biggest source of illicit drugs, surpassing the output of entire countries like Colombia (coca), Morocco (cannabis), and Myanmar (opium) – which have populations up to twenty times larger.

***Insurgency, greed and corruption***

This North-South divide highlights three new circumstances. First, opium cultivation in Afghanistan is no longer associated with poverty – quite the opposite. Hilmand, Kandahar and three other opium-producing provinces in the south are the richest and most fertile, in the past the breadbasket of the nation and a main source of earnings. They have now opted for illicit opium on an unprecedented scale (5,744 tons), while the much poorer northern region is abandoning the poppy crops.

Second, opium cultivation in Afghanistan is now closely linked to insurgency. The Taliban today control vast swathes of land in Hilmand, Kandahar and along the Pakistani border. By preventing national authorities and international agencies from working, insurgents have allowed greed and corruption to turn orchards, wheat and vegetable fields into poppy fields.

Third, the Taliban are again using opium to suit their interests. Between 1996 and 2000, in Taliban-controlled areas 15,000 tons of opium were produced and exported – the regime's sole source of foreign exchange at that time. In July 2000, the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, argued that opium was against Islam and banned its cultivation (but not its export). In recent months, the Taliban have reversed their position once again and started to extract from the drug economy resources for arms, logistics and militia pay.

***Rescuing Afghanistan from drugs and terror***

It would be an historic error to let Afghanistan collapse under the blows of drugs and insurgency. This double threat is real and growing, despite a foreign military presence in the tens of thousands, billions of dollars spent on reconstruction, and the huge political capital invested in stabilizing a country that has been in turmoil for a third of a century.

The opium problem cannot be contained solely by counter-narcotic measures, nor can counter-insurgency disregard the threat posed by drug-related funding to terrorists. The twin threats must be met by building upon the promising developments in the north-east, and by reacting to the dismal failures in the south-west. I therefore urge the Afghan Government and the international community to look into several new concrete initiatives in line with the Afghan National Drug Strategy.

*Higher rewards to non-opium farmers.* Although several sources of economic assistance to farmers are in place (i.e. the Counter-narcotics Trust Fund and the Good Performance Fund), expenditure is abysmally low because of ministerial competition, corruption and bureaucratic inertia -- nationally and internationally. Future aid must be focussed on a hand-full of priority programs (hospitals, schools, water and power) and disbursed quickly in amounts proportional to the progress made towards achieving an opium-free status. A no-opium pledge embedded in all assistance would facilitate meeting this goal.

*Higher risks for opium farmers.* Colombia, Morocco, Peru, Thailand and Laos have demonstrated that illicit crop eradication can be an important corrective and preventive measure. In 2007 opium crop eradication in Afghanistan (about 20,000 hectares, namely 10% of the cultivation) was higher than earlier, but still inadequate to reduce this year's harvest and to deter next year's planting. The Afghan government's opium eradication program should be undertaken more honestly and more vigorously. Mainly marginal fields were destroyed in 2007, often as the result of corrupt deals between field owners, village elders and eradication teams: as a result poor farmers suffered the brunt of eradication. In 2008, rich landlords, especially in the south of the country, should face the consequences of breaking the law.

*More opium-free provinces.* Historically, from the Andean range to the greater Mekong delta, governments have regained control of areas under drug cultivation by curtailing crops progressively, province by province, through a balance of rewards and risks. To an extent, this did happen in Afghanistan in 2007, during which 2/5 of the 34 provinces became opium free (more than twice last year's number). It is now realistic to set a target of at least half of the country's provinces becoming opium-free in 2008. Two additional qualitative goals should be set. First, provinces need to abandon not just opium cultivation but also its trade: even in the north of the country where opium crops have disappeared, drug trading and refining continue to flourish. Second, it is especially important to achieve zero opium cultivation in the provinces of Nangarhar and Badakhshan, in order to confine totally the opium problem to the southern insurgency-infested regions. Nangarhar is a case of back-sliding: in 2005 cultivation decreased by 95%, but in 2007 went right back to almost 19,000 ha. In Badakhshan, on the other hand, cultivation this year declined by 72%, making the opium-free goal realistic in the months to come.

*NATO to help taking on opium labs, markets and traffickers.* The opium economy of Afghanistan can be bankrupted by blocking the two-way flow of (i) imported chemicals, and (ii) exported drugs. In both instances several thousand tons of materials are being moved across the southern border and nobody seems to take notice. Since drug trafficking and insurgency live off of each other, the foreign military forces operating in Afghanistan have a vested interest in supporting counter-narcotics operations: destroying heroin labs, closing opium markets, seizing opium convoys and bringing traffickers to justice. This will generate a double benefit. First, the destruction of the drug trade will win popular support (only 1 out of 10 Afghan farming families cultivate opium, earning a disproportionately large share of the national income). Second, lower opium demand by traders will reduce its price and make alternative economic activity more attractive.

*Coherence in policy*. Drug metastases have spread throughout Afghanistan, providing capital for investments, foreign exchange for expensive imports, revenue to underpaid officials as well as funding for weddings, burials and pilgrimages. Corruption has facilitated the general profiteering. The government's benign tolerance of corruption is undermining the future: no country has ever built prosperity on crime. Similarly, in the provinces bordering with Pakistan, tacit acceptance of opium trafficking by foreign military forces as a way to extract intelligence information and occasional military support in operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaida undermines stabilization efforts.

*International actions against drug traffickers.* The Afghan judicial system is weak and vulnerable to corruption. Around the country more resources are needed to enhance integrity and increase the likelihood of retribution against crime. The new maximum-security prison at Poli-y-Charkee (near Kabul) still awaits major drug dealers -- rather than drivers and couriers. Also, the international arm of the law can now become longer and stronger. Resolution 1735 (2006) of the UN Security Council gives countries the possibility to include in the Taliban/Al-Qaida list the names of major drug traffickers connected to terrorism. In the course of 2007, the world

community should add a dozen of such traffickers' names to the Security Council list, in order to ban their travel, seize their assets and facilitate their extradition.

*Cross border cooperation.* The opium boom in Afghanistan and the instability at its borders is creating a sense of urgency and a convergence of interests among neighbouring countries. Some encouraging signs are there. The commitment by the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran to work towards the joint realization of physical barriers to block smuggling, increase law enforcement, run joint operations and share intelligence -- measures devised as part of the Triangular Initiative promoted by UNODC -- deserve international support, as a way of tackling a threat that defies national borders.

*Lower foreign demand for Afghan opium.* As UNODC has often pointed out, a major responsibility rests with the governments of opiates consuming countries in the European Union, the CIS nations and China. This concern remains urgent. Once again, the yearly Afghan opium harvest may kill, directly and not, over 100 thousand people. However, since the opium supply from Afghanistan currently exceeds global demand by an enormous margin (over 3,000 tons), the highest priority is to deal with the problem at the source – namely in Afghanistan. Health questions aside, opium stockpiles, a notorious store of value, could once again be used to fund international terrorism.

* * *

The Afghan opium situation looks grim, but it is not yet hopeless. The problem is increasingly localized in southern provinces along the Pakistan borders, where populations face threats reminiscent of what happened there a decade ago. Good results in the north-east demonstrate that progress is possible. It will take time, money and determination -- worthwhile investments to spare Afghanistan and the rest of the world more tragedies.



Antonio Maria Costa
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# 2007 Annual Opium Poppy Survey in Afghanistan

## Fact Sheet

| | 2006 | Difference on 2006 | 2007 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net opium poppy cultivation | 165,000 ha | +17% | 193,000 ha |
| In per cent of agricultural land | 3.65% | | 4.27% |
| In per cent of global cultivation | 82% | | 82% |
| Number of provinces affected | 28 | | 21 |
| Number of poppy free provinces | 6 | | 13 |
| Eradication | 15,300 ha | +24% | 19,047 ha |
| Weighted average opium yield | 37.0 kg/ha | +15% | 42.5 kg/ha |
| Potential production of opium | 6,100 mt | +34% | 8,200 mt |
| In percent of global production | 92% | | 93% |
| Number of households involved in opium cultivation | 448,000 | +14% | 509,000 |
| Number of persons involved in opium cultivation | 2.9 million | +14% | 3.3 million |
| In per cent of total population (23 million) | 12.6% | | 14.3% |
| Average farm-gate price (weighted by production) of fresh opium at harvest time | US$ 94/kg | -9% | US$ 86/kg |
| Average farm-gate price (weighted by production) of dry opium at harvest time | US$ 125/kg | -2% | US$ 122/kg |
| Afghanistan GDP[1] | US$ 6.7 billion | +12% | US$ 7.5 billion |
| Total farm-gate value of opium production | US$ 0.76 billion | +32% | US$ 1 billion |
| Total farm-gate value of opium in per cent of GDP | 11% | | 13% |
| Household average yearly gross income from opium of opium poppy growing families | US$ 1,700 | +16% | US$ 1,965 |
| Per capita gross income of opium poppy growing farmers | US$ 260 | +17% | US$ 303 |
| Afghanistan GDP per capita | US$ 290 | +7% | US$ 310 |
| Indicative gross income from opium per ha | US$ 4,600 | +13% | US$ 5,200 |
| Indicative gross income from wheat per ha | US$ 530 | +3% | US$ 546 |

[1] Source: Afghan Government, Central Statistical Office, preliminary estimate.

***Opium poppy cultivation reaches a new record level in 2007***

The area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased by 17% in 2007, from 165,000 hectares in 2006 to 193,000 hectares. As a result of the upsurge in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, global opium poppy cultivation rose by 17% in 2007 to over 234,000 hectares[2]. Afghanistan's share of global cultivation remains 82%.

**Figure 1: Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan (ha), 1994-2007**




| | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cultivation | 71,000 | 54,000 | 57,000 | 58,000 | 64,000 | 91,000 | 82,000 | 8,000 | 74,000 | 80,000 | 131,000 | 104,000 | 165,000 | 193,000 |

The 2007 increase is in line with the findings of the Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey implemented in January/February 2007 (UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Report,* February 2007).

The dynamics of opium poppy cultivation in 2007 revealed stronger than ever regional disparities. Sharp increases occurred in the south, west and east, and significant decreases took place in the north and north-east of the country. This corresponds to the security situation's increased polarization between the lawless south and relatively stable north of the country.

[2] Based on preliminary opium cultivation estimates for the rest of the world.

**Figure 2: Global opium poppy cultivation (ha), 1990-2007**




***Opium poppy cultivation in south and south-west Afghanistan rises sharply***

The number of security incidents increased sharply in 2006 and 2007, especially in the south and south-west of Afghanistan. Over the same period, opium poppy cultivation increased sharply in these regions. Some 80% of the opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2007 was located in Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Day Kundi, Zabul, Farah and Nimroz (154,981 ha) where security conditions have deteriorated markedly. Most of these areas were inaccessible to the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

**Table 1: Regional distribution of opium poppy cultivation, 2006-2007**

| Region | 2006 (ha) | 2007 (ha) | Change 2006-2007 | 2006 as % of total | 2007 as % of total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Southern Region | 101,900 | 133,546 | +31% | 62% | 69% |
| Northern Region | 22,574 | 4,882 | -78% | 14% | 3% |
| Western Region | 16,615 | 28,619 | +72% | 10% | 15% |
| North-East Region | 15,234 | 4,853 | -68% | 9% | 3% |
| Eastern Region | 8,312 | 20,581 | +148% | 5% | 11% |
| Central Region | 337 | 500 | +48% | 0% | 0% |
| **Rounded Total** | **165,000** | **193,000** | **+17%** | **100%** | **100%** |

Opium poppy cultivation in Hilmand province increased by almost 50% and reached 102,770 ha, compared to 69,324 ha in 2006. Fifty-three per cent of total opium poppy cultivation of Afghanistan was located in Hilmand. Cultivation in Hilmand province more than tripled between 2002 and 2007, bringing the area under opium poppy cultivation in 2007 nearly equal to total cultivation in Afghanistan in 2005 (104,000 ha).

In Kandahar province, opium poppy cultivation increased by one third to 16,615 ha in 2007 compared to 2006, despite the eradication of 7,905 ha of opium poppy. The sharp increase in opium poppy cultivation had started already in 2004 when only 4,959 ha were cultivated. Since then, the area under opium poppy has more than tripled.

Opium poppy cultivation in Nimroz province tripled compared to 2006 and reached 6,507 ha in 2007. The majority of the cultivation was located in Khash Rod district. Many new agricultural areas were identified in the northern part of this district in 2006 and 2007, a vast majority of which were used for opium poppy cultivation. Only 43 ha of opium poppy were eradicated in 2007 in Nimroz. In 2004, total opium poppy cultivation in this province was only 115 ha.

The total area under opium poppy in Farah province almost doubled to 14,865 ha in 2007. Eradication was very limited (179 ha). As in Kandahar, cultivation started to increase after 2004. In 2002, the total cultivation in this province amounted to only 500 ha.

**Table 2: Main opium poppy cultivation provinces in Afghanistan (ha), 2007**

| Province | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | Change 2006-2007 | % Total in 2007 | Cumulative % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hilmand | 15,371 | 29,353 | 26,500 | 69,324 | 102,770 | +48% | 53% | 53% |
| Nangarhar | 18,904 | 28,213 | 1,093 | 4,872 | 18,739 | +285% | 10% | 63% |
| Kandahar | 3,055 | 4,959 | 12,989 | 12,619 | 16,615 | +32% | 9% | 72% |
| Farah | 1,700 | 2,288 | 10,240 | 7,694 | 14,865 | +93% | 8% | 79% |
| Uruzgan | 4,698 | N/A | 2,024 | 9,773 | 9,204 | -6% | 5% | 84% |
| Nimroz | 26 | 115 | 1,690 | 1,955 | 6,507 | +233% | 3% | 87% |
| Rest of the country | 36,246 | 66,072 | 49,464 | 58,763 | 24,281 | -59% | 13% | 100% |
| **Rounded Total** | **80,000** | **131,000** | **104,000** | **165,000** | **193,000** | **17%** | | |

**Table 3: Opium poppy cultivation (2004-2007) and eradication (2006-2007) in Afghanistan**

| PROVINCE | Cultivation 2004 (ha) | Cultivation 2005 (ha) | Cultivation 2006 (ha) | Cultivation 2007 (ha) | Change 2006-2007 (ha) | Change 2006-2007 (%) | Estimated total area of eradication 2006 (ha) | Total area of eradication 2007 (ha) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kabul | 282 | 0 | 80 | 500 | 420 | 525% | 0 | 14 |
| Khost | 838 | 0 | 133 | 0 | -133 | -100% | 0 | 16 |
| Logar | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0 |
| Paktya | 1,200 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0 |
| Panjshir | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0 |
| Parwan | 1,310 | 0 | 124 | 0 | -124 | -100% | 0 | 1 |
| Wardak | 1,017 | 106 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0 |
| Ghazni | 62 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0 |
| Paktika | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0 |
| **Central Region** | **4,733** | **106** | **337** | **500** | **163** | **48%** | **0** | **31** |
| Kapisa | 522 | 115 | 282 | 835 | 553 | 196% | 0 | 10 |
| Kunar | 4,366 | 1,059 | 932 | 446 | -486 | -52% | 44 | 27 |
| Laghman | 2,756 | 274 | 710 | 561 | -149 | -21% | 9 | 802 |
| Nangarhar | 28,213 | 1,093 | 4,872 | 18,739 | 13867 | 285% | 337 | 2339 |
| Nuristan | 764 | 1,554 | 1,516 | 0 | -1516 | -100% | 5 | 0.44 |
| **Eastern Region** | **36,621** | **4,095** | **8,312** | **20,581** | **12,269** | **148%** | **395** | **3,178** |
| Badakhshan | 15,607 | 7,370 | 13,056 | 3,642 | -9414 | -72% | 921 | 1311 |
| Takhar | 762 | 1,364 | 2,178 | 1,211 | -967 | -44% | 35 | 781 |
| Kunduz | 224 | 275 | 102 | 0 | -102 | -100% | 0 | 5 |
| **North-Eastern Region** | **16,593** | **9,009** | **15,336** | **4,853** | **-10,483** | **-68%** | **956** | **2,097** |
| Baghlan | 2,444 | 2,563 | 2,742 | 671 | -2071 | -76% | 22 | 185 |
| Balkh | 2,495 | 10,837 | 7,232 | 0 | -7232 | -100% | 2370 | 14 |
| Bamyan | 803 | 126 | 17 | 0 | -17 | -100% | 0 | 0 |
| Faryab | 3,249 | 2,665 | 3,040 | 2,866 | -174 | -6% | 264 | 337 |
| Jawzjan | 1,673 | 1,748 | 2,024 | 1,085 | -939 | -46% | 48 | 122 |
| Samangan | 1,151 | 3,874 | 1,960 | 0 | -1960 | -100% | 136 | 0 |
| Sari Pul | 1,974 | 3,227 | 2,252 | 260 | -1992 | -88% | 1981 | 114 |
| **Northern Region** | **13,789** | **25,040** | **19,267** | **4,882** | **-14385** | **-75%** | **4,821** | **772** |
| Hilmand | 29,353 | 26,500 | 69,324 | 102,770 | 33446 | 48% | 4973 | 4003 |
| Kandahar | 4,959 | 12,989 | 12,619 | 16,615 | 3996 | 32% | 2829 | 7905 |
| Uruzgan | 11,080 | 2,024 | 9,703 | 9,204 | -499 | -5% | 0 | 204 |
| Zabul | 2,977 | 2,053 | 3,210 | 1,611 | -1599 | -50% | 0 | 183 |
| Day Kundi | 0 | 2,581 | 7,044 | 3,346 | -3698 | -52% | 28 | 5 |
| **Southern Region** | **48,369** | **46,147** | **101,900** | **133,546** | **31,646** | **31%** | **7,830** | **12,300** |
| Badghis | 614 | 2,967 | 3,205 | 4,219 | 1014 | 32% | 602 | 232 |
| Farah | 2,288 | 10,240 | 7,694 | 14,865 | 7171 | 93% | 562 | 143 |
| Ghor | 4,983 | 2,689 | 4,679 | 1,503 | -3176 | -68% | 0 | 188 |
| Hirat | 2,531 | 1,924 | 2,287 | 1,525 | -762 | -33% | 113 | 70 |
| Nimroz | 115 | 1,690 | 1,955 | 6,507 | 4552 | 233% | 26 | 35 |
| **Western Region** | **10,531** | **19,510** | **19,820** | **28,619** | **8,799** | **44%** | **1,303** | **668** |
| **Total (rounded)** | **131,000** | **104,000** | **165,000** | **193,000** | **28,000** | **17%** | **15,300** | **19,047** |

### *Nangarhar slips back to high level of opium poppy cultivation*

In 2007, opium poppy cultivation in Nangarhar increased by 285% to 18,739 ha. In 2005, the province had become almost opium poppy free as a result of self restriction on the part of farmers, which led to a 96% decrease on 2004. In 2006, opium poppy cultivation began to increase but could only in very remote parts of the province. By 2007, opium poppy cultivation was observed even in close proximity to the provincial capital. Significantly, two important tribes in Nangarhar did not follow the Government's opium ban, and this

led to a sharp increase in cultivation in the southern part of the province. Opium poppy cultivation in the northern part of the province is still very limited.

In Laghman province, opium poppy cultivation decreased by 21% and reached only 561 ha in 2007. In Kunar province, opium poppy cultivation declined to 446 ha in 2007, a 52% reduction compared to 2006. In both provinces, opium poppy cultivation was restricted to remote areas with difficult access.

***Number of opium poppy free provinces increases to 13 in 2007***

The number of opium poppy free provinces increased to 13 in 2007 compared to 6 in 2006[3]. These poppy free[4] provinces are: Balkh, Bamyan, Ghazni, Khost, Kunduz, Logar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktya, Panjshir, Parwan, Samangan and Wardak.

Unless serious action is taken in terms of external assistance to Balkh and other opium poppy free provinces, there is a high risk that they will resume opium poppy cultivation in the coming growing season.

***Potential opium production in Afghanistan peaks at 8,200 metric tons in 2007***

Weather conditions in 2007 were ideal for opium poppy, contributing to the highest opium yield of the last 5 years. Also, favorable weather conditions contributed to a lack of plant disease on opium poppy or on other crops. The average yield was 42.5 kg/ha at the country level compared to 37.0 kg/ha in 2006.

Record levels of cultivation and the high yield led to a 34% increase in potential opium production in Afghanistan for 2007 (8,200 metric tons). If all opium were converted into heroin, it would amount to 1,170 metric tons of the drug.

**Figure 3: Potential opium production in Afghanistan (metric tons), 1994-2007**




| | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Production | 3,416 | 2,335 | 2,248 | 2,804 | 2,693 | 4,565 | 3,276 | 185 | 3,400 | 3,600 | 4,200 | 4,100 | 6,100 | 8,200 |

[3] Opium poppy free provinces in 2006: Ghazni, Logar, Paktika, Paktya, Panjsher, and Wardak.
[4] Definition of opium poppy free status in 2007: province with less than 100 ha of opium poppy.

In 2007, opium production in Afghanistan was 24% higher than global opium production in 2006 (6,610 metric tons). The global opium production in 2007 reached its highest point since 1990: more than 8,800 metric tons[5]. The proportion of Afghanistan in global opium production increased from 92% to 93% in 2007.

**Figure 4: Global potential opium production (metric tons), 1990-2007**




In 2007, almost 81% of the national opium production was located in the south and southwest of Afghanistan. The opium production in Hilmand alone (4,399 metric tons) was higher than Afghanistan's total production in 2005 (4,100 mt).

**Table 4: Average opium yield per region in Afghanistan, 2006-2007**

| Region | 2006 Average yield (kg/ha) | 2007 Average yield (kg/ha) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Central Region (Parwan, Paktya, Wardak, Khost, Kabul, Logar, Ghazni, Paktika, Panjshir) | 23.3 | 51.9 | +123% |
| Eastern Region (Nangarhar, Kunar, Laghman, Nuristan, Kapisa) | 36.6 | 45.2 | +23% |
| North-Eastern Region (Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz) | 38.7 | 40.7 | +5% |
| Northern Region (Bamyan, Jawzjan, Sari Pul, Baghlan, Faryab, Balkh, Samangan) | 41.8 | 49.7 | +19% |
| Southern Region (Hilmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Zabul, Day Kundi) | 36.3 | 42.2 | +16% |
| Western Region (Ghor, Hirat, Farah, Nimroz, Badghis) | 32.3 | 28.8 | -11% |
| **Weighted national average** | **37.0** | **42.5** | **15%** |

Potential opium production in the Southern Region of Afghanistan increased by 55% to 5,745 metric tons, equivalent to 70% of the production in the country in 2007. Although yields were higher than in 2006, opium production decreased by 73% in the Northern

[5] Based on preliminary opium production estimates for the rest of the world.

Region to 233 mt, which was equivalent to 2.8% of the total production. In the Western Region, opium poppy cultivation increased by 44%, resulting in a 57% increase in opium production. Significant increases in cultivation in the Eastern Region (particularly in Nangarhar province) resulted in an opium production increase of 257% over 2006.

**Table 5: Potential opium production in Afghanistan (metric tons), 2006-2007**

| PROVINCE | Production 2006 (mt) | Production 2007 (mt) | Change 2006-2007 (mt) | Change 2006-2007 (%) | REGION |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kabul | 2 | 26 | +24 | +1,198% | Central |
| Khost | 3 | 0 | -3 | -100% | Central |
| Logar | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | Central |
| Paktya | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | Central |
| Panjshir | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | Central |
| Parwan | 3 | 0 | -3 | -100% | Central |
| Wardak | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | Central |
| Ghazni | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | Central |
| Paktika | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | Central |
| **Central Region** | **8** | **26** | **+18** | **+224%** | |
| Kapisa | 10 | 40 | +30 | +303% | Eastern |
| Kunar | 44 | 18 | -26 | -59% | Eastern |
| Laghman | 30 | 20 | -10 | -35% | Eastern |
| Nangarhar | 179 | 1,006 | +827 | +462% | Eastern |
| Nuristan | 41 | 0 | -41 | -100% | Eastern |
| **Eastern Region** | **304** | **1,084** | **+780** | **+257%** | |
| Badakhshan | 503 | 152 | -351 | -70% | North-Eastern |
| Takhar | 87 | 43 | -44 | -50% | North-Eastern |
| Kunduz | 4 | 0 | -4 | -100% | North-Eastern |
| **North-Eastern Region** | **594** | **195** | **-399** | **-67%** | |
| Baghlan | 134 | 36 | -98 | -73% | Northern |
| Balkh | 291 | 0 | -291 | -100% | Northern |
| Bamyan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | Northern |
| Faryab | 162 | 135 | -27 | -17% | Northern |
| Jawzjan | 92 | 54 | -38 | -41% | Northern |
| Samangan | 81 | 0 | -81 | -100% | Northern |
| Sari Pul | 106 | 9 | -97 | -92% | Northern |
| **Northern Region** | **866** | **234** | **-633** | **-73%** | |
| Hilmand | 2,801 | 4,399 | +1598 | +57% | Southern |
| Kandahar | 405 | 739 | +334 | +83% | Southern |
| Uruzgan | 236 | 411 | +175 | +74% | Southern |
| Zabul | 113 | 61 | -52 | -46% | Southern |
| Day Kundi | 148 | 135 | -13 | -9% | Southern |
| **Southern Region** | **3,703** | **5,745** | **+2042** | **+55%** | |
| Badghis | 73 | 100 | +27 | +37% | Western |
| Farah | 297 | 409 | +112 | +38% | Western |
| Ghor | 115 | 44 | -71 | -62% | Western |
| Hirat | 54 | 33 | -21 | -38% | Western |
| Nimroz | 71 | 372 | +301 | +424% | Western |
| **Western Region** | **610** | **959** | **+349** | **+57%** | |
| **Total (rounded)*** | **6,100** | **8,200** | **+2,100** | **+34%** | |

*Total national opium production is derived from the weighted average yield and total cultivation.

### *14.3% of the total population is involved in opium poppy cultivation*

In 2007, the survey estimated that 509,000 families were involved in opium poppy cultivation compared to 448,000 families in 2006 (a 14% increase). Given an average of 6-7 members per family, this represents an estimated total of about 3.3 million persons, or 14.3 % of Afghanistan's 23 million population.

The 14% increase in opium cultivating households in 2007 does not correspond directly to 'new' opium poppy growing farmers. About 46% of the opium poppy growing farmers in Afghanistan started to cultivate poppy before the year 2001, and about 54% after the year 2001. Only a small proportion of farmers started opium poppy cultivation in 2006 (3%) and in 2007 (4%). In the Southern and Eastern Regions, where opium poppy cultivation increased by 31% and 44% respectively, very few farmers had cultivated for the first time. Both in the Southern and Eastern Region, around 43% of the farmers who grew opium poppy in 2007 started opium poppy cultivation before 2001. These farmers did not necessarily cultivate every year.

**Figure 5: Starting year of opium poppy cultivation by region (n=724 farmers)**




### *Opium prices fall in 2007*

In 2007, the weighted average farm-gate price of fresh opium at harvest time was US$ 86/kg which is 9% lower than in 2006. Farm-gate prices of dry opium fell by 2% to US$ 122/kg (weighted price) at harvest time in 2007. Although opium prices were lower than in the period 2001-2003, they were still three times higher than during 1994-2000.

**Figure 6: Average farm-gate price of dry opium (US$/kg),September 2004 to July 2007**




**Figure 7: Fresh opium farm-gate prices at harvest time (weighted by production) in Afghanistan(US$/kg), 1994-2007**




Sources: UNODC, Opium Surveys 1994-2007

Opium prices decreased throughout Afghanistan due to increases in production. Prices decreased by 12% in the Eastern Region, 9% in the Northern Region and 17% in the Western Region. Opium prices did not fall much (6% decrease) in the Southern Region despite record levels of production. The highest dry opium prices were reported in the Eastern (US$ 168/kg) and Central Regions (US$ 167/kg). In 2005, opium prices in the Eastern Region rose due to a dramatic decline of opium production. In 2007, substantial opium production in Nangarhar province suppressed prices in 2006.

In general, prices in the Northern Region are lower than in other regions, reportedly because of the low morphine content of the opium produced in that region. The high transportation cost involved in moving a large part of the opium production from north to south Afghanistan for heroin production and onwards trafficking to other countries also has a dampening effect on prices.

**Table 6: Regional farm-gate prices of dry opium in Afghanistan at harvest time (US$/kg), 2007**

| Region | Average fresh opium price (US$/kg) 2006 | Average fresh opium price (US$/kg) 2007 | Change | Average dry opium price (US$/kg) 2006 | Average dry opium price (US$/kg) 2007 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central Region (Parwan, Paktya, Wardak, Khost, Kabul, Logar, Ghazni, Paktika, Panjshir) | 151 | 124 | -18% | 207 | 167 | -19% |
| Eastern Region (Nangarhar, Kunar, Laghman, Nuristan, Kapisa) | 101 | 89 | -12% | 191 | 168 | -12% |
| North-Eastern Region (Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz) | 79 | 71 | -10% | 125 | 86 | -31% |
| Northern Region (Bamyan, Jawzjan, Sari Pul, Baghlan, Faryab, Balkh, Samangan) | 77 | 71 | -8% | 99 | 90 | -9% |
| Southern Region (Hilmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Zabul, Day Kundi) | 99 | 85 | -14% | 122 | 115 | -6% |
| Western Region (Ghor, Hirat, Farah, Nimroz, Badghis) | 106 | 98 | -8% | 150 | 125 | -17% |
| **National average price weighted by production** | **94** | **86** | **-9%** | **125** | **122** | **-2%** |

Since 1997, UNODC has been collecting opium prices regularly from various provinces and circulating monthly opium price reports to important stakeholders. These reports showed that opium prices have been decreasing throughout Afghanistan since January 2007. The farm-gate price for dry opium in July 2007 was US$ 105/kg compared to US$ 140/kg a year earlier, which corresponded to a 25% decrease. Prices were considerably higher in Nangarhar and Nimroz provinces.

Although opium production increased considerably in 2006 and again in 2007, opium prices did not fall as much as one would have expected. A possible explanation could be that after the sharp decrease in opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar and Laos in recent years, opium from Afghanistan appears to be increasingly trafficked to China, India and

South-East Asia, which were traditionally supplied mainly with opium from the Golden Triangle.

### *Total farm-gate value of opium increased 32% to US$ 1 billion*

Based on opium production and reported opium prices, the farm-gate value of the opium harvest amounted to US$ 1 billion in 2007. Higher production (34%) and only slightly lower prices (-2%) resulted in a 32% increase of the overall farm-gate value of opium production over 2006 (760 million). The farm-gate value of opium as a proportion of GDP in 2007 (US$ 7.5 billion) increased to 13%, compared to 11% in 2006.

### *Increased opium income for Hilmand farmers*

In 2007, the total opium income for farmers in Hilmand province amounted to US$ 528 million compared to US$ 347 million in 2006. This is much higher than the opium farm-gate income of the two previous years, 2005 and 2006, combined (US$ 486 million).

The Opium Winter Assessment Survey 2007 indicated that more than 80% of farming families in this province were involved in opium poppy cultivation. According to the 2006 survey results, at least 35% of a farmer's annual cash income in Hilmand came from opium. These figures indicate the strong and growing dependence of the province's economy on opium.

### *Reasons for cultivation/non-cultivation of opium poppy*

As part of the survey, 2,996 farmers in 1,500 villages across Afghanistan were asked for their reasons for growing or not growing opium poppy. Farmers who never cultivated opium poppy reported 'religion' as the main reason (38%), followed by 'illegal crop' (28%) and respect for a shura/elders decision (18%). Only 0.4% of the farmers did not cultivate opium poppy due to fear of eradication.

**Figure 8: Reasons for never having cultivated opium poppy (n=1,494 farmers from 1,500 villages)**



Within the group of farmers who stopped opium poppy cultivation in 2007, 27% reported that 'religion' was the main ground for their decision. This was followed by elders/shura decision (16%) and fear of eradication (16%). 16% of responses indicated a recognition that opium poppy was an illegal crop, which can be interpreted as an impact of pre-planting awareness campaigns.

**Figure 9: Reasons for not having cultivated opium poppy in 2007 (n=2,272 farmers from 1,500 villages)**




Shura decisions and religion are less important in the Southern Region of Afghanistan compared to the other regions. In the Central Region, 'shura decisions' and religion are determinants in farmers' decisions about opium poppy cultivation. In the Eastern Region, farmers are more concerned about respecting the Government opium poppy ban than in other regions.

In 2007, the main reasons for opium poppy cultivation were 'poverty alleviation' and 'high sale price of opium' (29% and 25% respectively). In the Northern, North-Eastern and Central Regions farmers also reported that 'personal consumption' was a dominant reason for opium poppy cultivation. 'High wedding costs' were mentioned by 13% of the respondents.

**Figure 10: Reasons for opium poppy cultivation in 2007 (n=724 farmers from 1,500 villages)**




The majority of the farmers (98%) reported that they would be ready to stop opium poppy cultivation should access to alternative livelihoods be provided. When asked about alternatives to opium poppy cultivation, 28% of farmers preferred the provision of off-farm employment, 23% preferred to farm other crops with the same income, 12% preferred provision of credits, 10% asked for marketing facilities and 9% preferred agricultural subsidies. 8% of farmers preferred other crops with at least half of the income from opium.

**Figure 11: Alternatives reported by farmers for opium poppy (n=724 poppy growing farmers)**



### *The largest opium poppy cultivation provinces are not the poorest*

According to the UNODC 2006 Village Survey, household income for farmers in the Southern Region is higher than for farmers living in other regions. However, non-growing households in the Southern Region reported also higher incomes than in other regions. Therefore, it is very difficult to view the increase in opium poppy cultivation in the Southern Region as correlating with poverty problems.

**Table 7: Annual household income in surveyed areas (2006 village survey data)**

| Region | Average annual income for poppy growing farmers US$ | Average annual income for non poppy growing farmers US$ | % difference between poppy growing and non poppy growing farmers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Central | 1,897 | 1,487 | 22% |
| Eastern | 2,187 | 1,818 | 17% |
| North-eastern | 2,134 | 1,134 | 47% |
| Northern | 2,690 | 1,851 | 31% |
| Southern | 3,316 | 2,480 | 25% |
| Western | 2,258 | 1,721 | 24% |
| **Overall** | **2,747** | **1,754** | **36%** |

### *Security and opium poppy cultivation show strong correlation*

Security incidents in Afghanistan increased every year since 2003. Figure 12 shows security incidents from January 2003 to May 2007 as recorded by UNDSS. In parallel with opium poppy cultivation, the number of security incidents increased sharply after 2004, particularly in the south and south-west. The majority of opium poppy cultivated in 2007 was concentrated in Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Day Kundi, Farah and Nimroz provinces where security is very poor. Most of the districts in this region are not accessible to the UN and NGOs. Anti-government elements as well as drug traders are very active in this region. The security map shows the difference between southern and northern provinces in terms of security.

In Nangarhar province, opium poppy cultivation increased in the southern part of the province where security conditions are precarious. Moreover, some influential tribes decided to grow opium poppy in 2007. The resistance to opium poppy eradication was very strong in the area controlled by these powerful tribes.

**Figure 12: Number of security incidents by month, January 2003 to May 2007**




***A total of 19,047 ha of eradication is recorded***

In 2007, total effective eradication (including Governor-led and AEF-led eradication) reached 19,047 hectares. The details of eradication are as follows:

**Table 8: Governor-led eradication figures by province (ha), 2007**

| Province | Eradication (ha) verified (includes eradication during lancing stage) | Eradication (ha) verified after first lancing | Effective eradication verified (ha) (eradication upto first lancing) | No. of fields where eradication reported | No. of villages where eradication reported | Total ha of poppy remaining after eradication in surveyed villages | % of opium poppy eradication in surveyed villages |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Badakhshan | 1,311 | | 1,311 | 2,475 | 273 | 517 | 72 |
| Badghis | 232 | | 232 | 1,322 | 34 | 3,491 | 6 |
| Baghlan | 185 | | 185 | 273 | 33 | 17 | 92 |
| Balkh | 14 | | 14 | 25 | 3 | 11 | 56 |
| Day Kundi | 5 | | 5 | 102 | 5 | 13 | 29 |
| Farah | 143 | | 143 | 301 | 36 | 1,626 | 8 |
| Faryab | 337 | | 337 | 1,456 | 110 | 85 | 80 |
| Ghor | 188 | | 188 | 242 | 37 | 530 | 26 |
| Hilmand | 1,945 | 943 | 1,003 | 648 | 93 | 3,706 | 34 |
| Hirat | 70 | | 70 | 259 | 65 | 270 | 21 |
| Jawzjan | 122 | | 122 | 209 | 17 | 0 | 100 |
| Kabul | 14 | | 14 | 53 | 5 | 8 | 64 |
| Kandahar | 7,905 | | 7,905 | 3,028 | 425 | 4,951 | 61 |
| Kapisa | 10 | | 10 | 398 | 34 | 45 | 18 |
| Khost | 18 | 2 | 16 | 171 | 12 | 0 | 100 |
| Kunar | 55 | 28 | 27 | 442 | 33 | 9 | 85 |
| Kunduz | 5 | | 5 | 17 | 2 | 0 | 100 |
| Laghman | 802 | | 802 | 2,497 | 100 | 111 | 88 |
| Nangarhar | 3,048 | 709 | 2,339 | 8,002 | 548 | 13,775 | 18 |
| Nimroz | 35 | | 35 | 87 | 16 | 125 | 22 |
| Nuristan | 0 | | 0 | 8 | 2 | 13 | 3 |
| Parwan | 4 | 3 | 1 | 144 | 4 | 0 | 100 |
| Sari Pul | 119 | 5 | 114 | 233 | 41 | 25 | 83 |
| Takhar | 716 | | 716 | 2,249 | 140 | 268 | 73 |
| Uruzgan | 121 | | 121 | 156 | 18 | 445 | 21 |
| Zabul | 183 | | 183 | 67 | 23 | 61 | 75 |
| **Total** | **17,587** | **1,689** | **15,898** | **24,864** | **2,109** | **30,103** | **37** |

In 2007, UNODC and MCN verifiers visited 2,109 villages (24,864 opium poppy fields) in 26 provinces where eradication had been carried out by Governor-led eradication teams. In 2006, surveyors visited some 1,400 villages in 19 provinces.

UNODC and MCN jointly verified a total of 15,898 ha of Governor-led poppy eradication. In accordance with the definition in the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) of "effective eradication", eradication after the first lancing was not taken into consideration.

AEF reported a final figure for total eradication of 3,149 hectares, including 3,000 ha in Hilmand province, 83.44 ha in Uruzgan province and 65.22 ha in Takhar province. UNODC did not verify AEF-led eradication.

Most of the Governor-led eradication took place in Kandahar province (36 per cent), followed by Nangarhar (15 per cent), Hilmand (14 per cent) and Badakhshan (6 per cent).

On average, 63% of cultivated poppy was left standing after eradication teams had carried out their activities in the 2,109 villages visited by verifiers in 2007, though there was considerable regional variation.

The methods employed by the Governor-led eradication teams included tractor, animal-drawn plough and manual eradication (using sticks or sickles). 77% of the Governor-led eradication was carried out by tractor.

**Figure 13: Area of eradicated opium poppy by eradication method**



Eradication by tractor

Eradication by plough

Eradication by stick

***Timing and percentage of eradication by month***

The graph below shows the timing and percentage of Governor-led eradication each month. Eradication activities were carried out chiefly in March 2007 (27%) and April 2007 (36%). Only 12% of eradication activities were carried out during the early months of cultivation (between November and January), clearly showing the delayed implementation of eradication policy in most of the provinces. Early eradication enabled farmers to cultivate alternative crops, when available, and no security problem was observed. Most of the security incidents happened close to the harvesting time.

**Figure 14: Proportion of total area eradicated each month**




***Impact of eradication on cultivation***

Eradication did not contribute to an effective reduction in cultivation in most of the provinces. In Badakhshan, eradication was carried out at an early stage, thus allowing farmers to cultivate alternative crops. This, together with a relatively successful pre-planting campaign, contributed to an overall decline in opium poppy cultivation. The extent of eradication since 2005 is shown in the table below.

**Table 9: Total eradication in Afghanistan, 2005-2007**

| Year | Eradication (ha) | No. of provinces |
|---|---|---|
| 2005 | 4,007 | 11 |
| 2006 | 13,378 | 19 |
| 2007 | 15,898 | 26 |

The Rapid Assessment Survey conducted in January 2007 indicated that the eradication campaign of 2006 had had no significant impact on cultivation at the national level in 2007. Sixty-three per cent of villages opted once again to cultivate poppy in 2007, despite having faced eradication in 2006.

### *Comparison of opium poppy eradication in 2007 and 2006*

Eradication (Governor-led and AEF) in 2007 (19,047 ha) increased by 24% as compared to total eradication in 2006 (15,300 ha). In total, Governor-led eradication amounted to 15,898 ha in 2007, as compared to 13,378 ha in 2006. This is a 19 per cent increase. Eradication in 2007 was more intensive during its early phase (from January to March) than in 2006.

### *Security incidents during opium poppy eradication*

In 2007, there was much more resistance to eradication than in 2006. Several security incidents were reported in 2007. Sixteen security incidents in which eradication was resisted were reported from seven provinces, namely Nangarhar, Kandahar, Farah, Laghman, Hilmand, Badghis and Badakhshan. Fifteen policemen and four farmers died as a result of the incidents. Thirty-one people were severely injured, and several tractors used in eradication were burned by farmers. The highest number of incidents was reported from Nangarhar, followed by Kandahar and Farah.

**Table 10: Summary of security incidents**

| Province | No. of security incidents | No. of fatalities among police personnel | No. of fatalities among farmers | No. of injuries | No. of tractors burned |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nangarhar | 7 | 4 | 3 | 13 | 3 |
| Kandahar | 3 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1 |
| Farah | 2 | 6 | | 4 | 6 |
| Laghman | 1 | 2 | | 5 | |
| Hilmand | 1 | 2 | | 2 | |
| Badghis | 1 | | | | |
| Badakhshan | 1 | | | | |
| **Total** | **16** | **15** | **4** | **31** | **10** |

### *Cannabis cultivation is increasing and becoming as lucrative as opium poppy*

In 2007, it was estimated that cannabis cultivation increased to 70,000 ha from 50,000 ha in 2006. The increase gives reason for concern. Although this survey was not designed to estimate cannabis cultivation in Afghanistan, the socio-economic data collected from 1,500 villages and interviews with 4,500 farmers gives an indication of cannabis cultivation trends.

Cannabis prices have been increasing in last two years and ranged between US$ 48/kg and US$ 61/kg in June 2007 with an average of US$ 53/kg. Taking into account that cannabis yields about twice the quantity of drug per hectare compared to opium poppy, and requires lower investments for cultivation, cannabis farmers may earn the same amount per hectare as opium farmers or more. As a consequence, farmers who do not cultivate opium poppy may turn to cannabis cultivation.

### *Drug Trafficking*

According to surveyors's reports, in 2007, the number of heroin laboratories in Afghanistan increased. It is common knowledge that there are important opium markets and heroin laboratories in the Musa Qala and Sangin districts of Hilmand. However, these laboratories and markets have so far not been destroyed. In the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, opiate and precursor trafficking is mainly controlled by tribes whereas in the northern provinces they are controlled by local commanders.

According to the Afghan Government, there are at least 167 unofficial border crossing points between Afghanistan and neighboring countries. This figure seems to be rather on the low side as most of the Pakistan-Afghan border in the south and the Afghan-Iran border in the southwest are not well controlled. There are probably hundreds of unofficial border crossing points between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Pakistan.

Most of the opium produced in Afghanistan is converted to heroin within the country. However, the precursors needed for this conversion are not available in Afghanistan, which means that they are imported via neighboring countries. In short, Afghanistan exports opiates and imports precursors from neighboring countries.

# Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2005-2007




Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

# Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2007 (at province level)




Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

# Opium poppy cultivation change in Afghanistan (by province), 2006 - 2007




Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

## Opium production in Afghanistan by province (mt), 2007




Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

## Regional opium poppy cultivation and production in Afghanistan, 2007




Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

**Security map ( as at 15 May 2007) and opium poppy cultivation change in Afghanistan by province, 2006-2007**




Source security map: UNDSS
Source cultivation :Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

**Afghanistan: Verified Governor-led Eradication in 2007**




Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

# Afghanistan: Verified governor-led Eradication in 2007 (by district)




Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

# Heroin and opium trafficking in Afghanistan




Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.